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ABSTRACT
This paper intends to analyze the association between NBA statistics and winning
percentage and determine if that same relationship holds for player compensation and individual
player statistics. To determine the associations, two separate multiple regressions are utilized
during the NBA seasons, 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. This paper finds that teams are not
effectively compensating players, with more analytical inclined front offices being more
effective at compensating players.
KEYWORDS: NBA, Salary, Effective Allocation, Regression, and Statistics
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INTRODUCTION
The National Basketball Association is a collection of thirty professional basketball
teams in the United States and Canada. It is currently the third largest professional sports league
in North America with approximately $5 billion dollars in revenue.1 Also, the National
Basketball Association distributes a significant amount of salary to its players, which adds to the
intrigue of the game. Each team had a salary cap $63 million in 2014-2015, which is a soft limit
of how much salary that a team can distribute to its roster before having to pay penalties.2 3 With
the sheer size and interest in the National Basketball Association, scholars and fans alike have an
interest on the salaries of the National Basketball Association players.
The question of whether or not National Basketball Association players are paid enough
has often been about the perspective according to scholars. Frank Scott, James Long and Ken
Somppi (1985) say that the discussion was previously more qualitative in nature. In their study,
Scott et al. found that fans and owners believed that National Basketball Association players
were overpaid.4 These fans appeared to believe that National Basketball Association players did
not deserve their salaries because National Basketball Association players could be paid millions
of dollars more than the average person.5 While common fans believe that players were overpaid
based on qualitative and relative examinations, economists disagree. Previously, with restrictions
in labor markets like the lack of a free agency, National Basketball Association players may have
been in fact underpaid like Major League Baseball players were. In fact, scholars like Gerald
Scully (1974) have determined that players are paid less relative to the amount of money they
brought to their teams in the 1970’s. Scully compared the players’ marginal revenue products
with their actual salaries, which should be equal if baseball was perfectly competitive, and found
there to be an imbalance.6 Like the Major League Baseball, the removal of labor market
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restrictions and addition of free agency has resulted in National Basketball Association players’
salaries more closely reflecting their value to their teams, according to studies by Cassing and
Douglass (1980).7 Since scholars and fans have disagreed about the relative worth of players, it
is important to note that there are differentiating factors that go into the calculation of a player’s
salary.
The idea that there is a constant tug and barter between players and owners about salary
continues to be important even today. Bargaining agreements between players and owners are
one of the main determinants of the size of the salary cap and ultimately how much players are
paid. James R. Hill and Nicholas A. Jolly (2012) point to the 1998-1999 collective bargaining
agreement as the year when there was an imposed a cap on individual salaries and team
payrolls.8 The impetus that dove the imposed cap on salaries was Kevin Garnett. Hill and Jolly
say that because Kevin Garnett, in only his second year, signed a new contract that made him the
fourth highest player in the National Basketball Association, there were subsequent escalations
to salaries.9 With growing salaries and costs, owners locked out the players and instituted the
1998-1999 collective bargaining agreement. Players were no longer considered underpaid; the
team owners believed that the players were overpaid. One consequence of the collective
bargaining agreement was that because premier players had an artificial cap on salaries, the
distribution of player salary relative to skill no longer matched. In Hill and Jolly’s research, they
calculated the Theil and Gini, which serve to measure the economic inequality to analyze this
issue. They found that the rookie scale in 1995 collective bargaining agreement with the
introduction of the individual salary caps and the extension of the rookie scale in the 1998
collective bargaining agreement actually created a more uniform distribution of income.10 This is
an issue because now teams were paying players inefficiently. Neil Paine (2015) of Five Thirty
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Eight also found this inefficiency. Paine compared the amount of wins a player added to the team
and how much his salary was. He discovered that superstar players and rookies are paid far less
than they deserve based on their skill levels while average rotation players were overpaid.11 The
constant pull and tug from new collective bargaining agreement drives one factor of the salary
distribution.
Over the last decade or so, the quantitative shift has occurred in the National Basketball
Association and in the basketball academic community, impacting the way people look at
salaries. In 2006, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan Analytics Conference was
created to discuss the role of analytics in sports. Quantitative research was one of the talking
points about the importance for analyzing salaries. Now, the discussion revolves around how
general managers assign value to players. Offensive statistics from box scores have typically had
a higher correlation with how much a player is paid.12 One of the possible reasons for this
phenomenon that offensive statistics are more correlated with salary is how difficult it is to
isolate an individual player’s defensive impact. Kirk Goldsberry (2015) of Harvard University
calls attention to this saying that previously it was difficult to analyze the defensive impact of a
player with just traditional statistics unlike the more observable offensive statistics.13 Nuoya Li
(2014) of Clemson University analyzed offensive and defensive statistics of players in contract
years, in which players are playing for a new contract. In her study, she found that while many
offensive statistics such as points and assists are individually significant to salary, only blocks
are individually significant to salary.14 Other defensive statistics like steals and defensive
rebounds are not individually significant in her research.15 This indicates that there is a positive
relationship between scoring points and passing out assists with increased salary but there is not
necessarily a relationship with an increase in salary for steals. Adam Fromal (2015) similarly
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finds that if players increase their offensive percentile they get paid more, but this is not the case
if players increase their defensive percentile.16 However, while Li and Fromal have found that
offensive players have been compensated more for their observable statistics, not all scholars
have agreed. Dan Rust, of University of Mississippi, found that certain defensive statistics,
namely allowing points off post ups and pick and rolls are statistically significant to salary.17
Currently, it seems that there are scholars who have found that offensive statistics do matter for
players’ salaries but other scholars also argue that teams still do take into consideration defensive
statistics when determining salaries.
SIGNIFICANCE
The premise for conducting this research is to shape the way people look at National
Basketball Association salaries. Primarily, this research is conducted for the benefit of National
Basketball Association front offices and general managers as they go through the decision
making process for how to select free agents and to retain current players at what salary.
Previously, they may have placed excessive emphasis on observable offensive box score
statistics. With this research seeking to answer which player adds more expected wins, every
general manager can more efficiently allocate their rosters. Specifically, after reading this
research, teams gain knowledge on what specific statistics (offensive statistic, defensive statistic
or a more holistic statistic encompassing both) lead to more wins. By doing so, general managers
can easily compare players at the same position as well as against other positions. This is
important as the salary cap makes it difficult for teams from spending as much as they want.
Teams can be shrewd and spend their salary on two players that add more value to the team than
one individual player at the same price. Furthermore, players, likewise, can use the research to
gauge how much they are worth in free agency and through trade. The players’ union is also
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integrally related to the players’ salaries, and they can use the research to effectively bargain
with the league. Adam Silver, the commissioner, cares because he is face of the National
Basketball Association. He has to plan accordingly to make the game as profitable for not only
the owners but also placate the concerns of the players. Lastly, the research is interesting for
other sport researchers and fans of the game who are enjoy looking at the quantitative
complexities of free agency and trade transactions.
When reading the research paper, people will have many expectations on the quantitative
aspects of the paper. Firstly, as this is targeted primarily for practical use and secondarily for
academic use, people will expect to see the most relevant and recent data. They expect to see
data that comes from the last few years as teams are developing more analytical front offices. As
the paper will be finished in April of 2016, National Basketball Association front offices and
players would expect a guide that covers the National Basketball Association 2016-2017 season.
Furthermore, the more quantitative scholarly audience will expect to see statistically significant
correlations that create the foundation of the research.
While there has been statistical analysis done on various determinants of salary, this
research will also utilize those determinants to create a player salary guide that utilizes the most
up to date traditional box score data and new statistical measures that is useful in determining
current and future players’ salaries. The paper will not only cover if there is a relationship with
certain player statistics with how much they make, but also how to combine the different
statistics into a practical tool to use in free agency and trade negotiations. Also, this research can
continue to add to the discussion on what type of statistics, namely if new created comprehensive
statistics like Win Share (a statistical measure created to take into consideration of traditional
offensive and defensive box score statistics like points, assists, rebounds, blocks and steals) and
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Real Plus-Minus (a statistical measure that takes into consideration for quality of teammates into
a player’s net point value while being on the court) have a greater impact on winning. This not
only adds to the scholarly and academic discussion but also for general managers seeking to field
a team.
HYPOTHESIS
Through this research’s analysis of previous studies, general managers and National
Basketball Association teams seem to pay players more for observable offensive characteristics.
Offensive statistics such as points per game may not be the best determinate for expected number
of wins. The focus on paying players could be based more than just points, but rather defensive
characteristics or a holistic advanced statistics that take into consideration the overall impact a
player has on the court. The invention of more sophisticated analytical ratings such as Win
Shares and Real Plus-Minus encompasses the overall impact a player has on the court and may
show a greater correlation and statistically significant explanatory power with wins. If National
Basketball Association general managers are not focusing on the right statistical determinants to
increase winning, they are inefficiently allocating their salary cap on players.
FRAMEWORK
The research is quantitative in nature and employs statistical analysis, primarily through
regression to find the correlations between certain statistics and wins. The league wide data
comes from a public source, Basketball Reference. Basketball Reference not only provided the
Win/Loss records for all thirty teams but also the box score and more advanced statistics. For the
2013-2014 and 2014-2015 season, Basketball Reference provided the source for each team’s
PS/G, PA/G, FG, FGA, FG%, 3P, 3PA, 3P%, 2P, 2PA, 2P%, FT, FTA, FT%, ORB, DRB, TRB,
AST, STL, BLK, TOV, PF (Table 1). Basketball Reference did not include the team’s
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accumulated advanced statistics, so to calculate the team’s advanced statistics, the sum was taken
from each of the team’s players including PER, OWS, DWS, WS, OBPM, DBPM, BPM.
METHODOLOGY
To narrow the large set of data down to statistics that are most associated to wins, this
research applies a correlation cutoff (Table 2). With the narrowed down set of variables, this
research completed a multiple regression of certain team statistics (X variable) with wins (Y
variable) to determine if they are statistically significant by utilizing t-tests at the 95% and 99%
confidence interval. The data for league consists of the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 NBA seasons
giving 60 total observations. The regression is completed on JMP statistical software. The
application of regression and t-tests for significance are common theoretical frameworks that are
utilized by scholars like Rust and Li.
After determining the team statistics that are statistically significant with winning, this
research examines whether teams are compensating players according to those statistics. Using a
similar process, a correlation cutoff is employed to narrow the data, which consists of the NBA
2014-2015 NBA season. Then conducting a multiple regression of certain player statistics (X
variable) with salary (Y variable) and examining the statistics that are statistically significant at
the 95% and 99% confidence interval. By doing so, the research is making an implicit
assumption that teams only care about winning and that teams do not consider external
basketball factors like sponsorship and viewership.
After finding the statistic with the highest statistically significant correlation to wins, this
research builds a ratio that indicates how much a team should pay for a player. The formula that
indicates how much a team should pay a player is Player Statistic*(Total Salary)/(Total Statistic).
With each unit of individual player statistic, the player should be compensated by that ratio.
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By calculating the efficient projected salary of players gives many interesting and
practical results. This research is then able to analyze how efficient each team is at paying
players. By sorting the players’ salaries by their respective teams, the projected salary of the
team can be calculated. The teams with the lowest actual salaries minus the projected salaries
indicate an ability to not overpay players and perhaps an ability to find good players at cheap
price. The teams with the highest actual salaries minus projected salaries are teams that overpay
their players to the detriment of their teams.
RESULTS
After narrowing down the data to statistics by correlations, only PS/G, FG%, 3P%, 2P%,
Win Shares and DBPM have correlations of .6 after limiting variables due to possible
collinearity (70%+ correlation with each other i.e. FG% and FGA). The multiple regression
indicated that only Win Share is statistically significant at 99% confidence interval. 2P% and
DBPM are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval (Table 3).
If teams are truly compensating players based on their added win contribution, then the
salaries should be associated with Win Shares and possibly 2P% and DBPM. However, after
narrowing down the data to statistics that had correlations greater than .6 only left MP, FG, 2P,
FTA, DRB, TOV and PTS (Table 4). Win Share and DBPM at the league level showed
explanatory power for wins did not have explanatory power for player salaries. After completing
the multiple regression of salary against MP, FG, 2P, FTA, DRB, TOV and PTS, only MP, DRB
and TOV are statistically significant (Table 5).
Win Share has the most explanatory power for wins based on it’s .9 correlation with wins
and being statistically significant at 99% confidence interval, so this research paper utilizes it as
the factor for determining efficient salary. To utilize Win Share into a useable formula, this
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research uses the total salary divided by the total Win Share, 1256 to get $1.7 million/(Win
Share), which means for every Win Share, a player is worth $1.7 million per year. For example,
a 2 Win Share player is worth $3.4 million dollars per year in this current salary cap. Then
applying this ratio throughout the NBA, each player will be paid accordingly. When the salary
cap rises, teams can effectively annually adjust the ratio with new inputs for total salary cap and
total Win Share. Teams then can utilize these projections to find undervalued players who are
asking for less than the ratio says they deserve. Ideally finding a player that contributes more
wins at a cheaper price.
The calculation of the projected salaries for players clearly showed that teams are not
compensating players effectively. To define whether or not players were not fairly compensated,
there needed to be a criterion for not only the absolute difference but also the percentage
difference (Table 6). Using 2 million dollars as an overpayment minimum as well as being paid
25% more than the projected salary netted 95 players being overpaid. 2 million is a suitable
amount as it puts into perspective the absolute amounts of money. Likewise, the 25% is a catch
for players who make more significantly more than 10 million dollars, where 2 million is
negligible. The top overpaid players by salary difference from projected and actual are Kobe
Bryant, Amar’e Stoudemire, Carmelo Anthony, Derrick Rose and Joe Johnson (Table 7). There
are 121 underpaid players who are being paid $2 million dollars less than their projected salary
and 25% less than their projected salaries. The players who are exceeding their contracts are
Anthony Davis, Jimmy Butler, Stephen Curry, Rudy Gobert, Damian Lilliard, and Draymond
Green (Table 8). These players are producing more wins than their salary indicates they should.
It’s important to note that most of these underpaid players are being paid on their rookie deal or
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second deal. They are going to be paid much more in the future, for example Anthony Davis
signed a five year, $145 million dollar contract.
After sorting players by team, teams are sorted by their effectiveness in paying players by
Win Shares. Atlanta did the best in allocating pay, overpaying their players by only $1,084,894.
New York, Brooklyn and Los Angeles did the worst, overpaying their players by over $30
million a year (Table 9). ESPN compiled a front office analytical ranking of NBA teams with
four teams being all in on using analytics, eight teams being believers, nine being one foot in, six
being skeptics on analytics and three being non believers. As expected, the more analytical the
front office was based on ESPN’s ranking, the better it did on this research’s salary allocation
projections. For example, all-in analytical offices average effectiveness is 10 but the non
believers average effectiveness is 29 (Table 10). The all in and believers winning percentages are
also higher than the one foot in, skeptics and non believers (Table 10).
CONCLUSION
Based on the results, it seems clear that some teams are not efficiently paying their
players. The first multiple regression indicated that 2P% and DBPM are both statistically
significant for winning percentage at the 95% confidence interval, Win Share is statistically
significant at the 99% confidence interval. However, the second multiple regression indicates
that teams are paying players based on MP, DRB and TOV. While initially this research
hypothesized that teams compensating more based on observable offensive statistics, it’s actually
not the case. The other takeaway is that teams are not compensating their players based on the
statistics that are most associated with winning. With over 200 combined players that are either
overpaid or underpaid, teams could do a better job scouting and analyzing players before giving
contracts. What’s interesting is that teams who are efficiently compensating their players based
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on this research’s model also tended to be ranked by ESPN as All-In and Believers of analytics.
They also happen to have the better records in the NBA. This tends to indicate that the more
analytical the front office is the more they subscribe to the type of analysis that this research
conducted. With more teams implementing analytics into front offices, the inefficiencies should
lessen. For now, this research is applicable to front offices looking to sign, trade and give
contract extensions. To find underpaid players, it seems prudent to draft well and get players that
perform in excess of what their salary dictates they should like Anthony Davis.
There are certain statistical issues that this research may have when analyzing salaries.
There may be collinearity issues when looking at different statistics that may also have a
relationship with each other. Also, this research has to recognize that by projecting players’ Win
Share, the focus is on a player’s past performance, not necessarily their future performance. As
there are always going to be difficulties making forecasts, by using past performance there is at
least something that builds the foundation for the forecasts.
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1. Terms Definitions
Box Score Statistics
W (Wins)
L (Losses)
FG (Field Goals Made)
FGA (Field Goals Attempted)
FG% (Field Goal Percentage Made)
3P (3 Point Field Goals Made)
3PA (3 Point Field Goals Attempted)
3P% (3 Point Field Goal Percentage Made)
2P (2 Point Field Goals Made)
2PA (2 Point Field Goals Attempted)
2P% (2 Point Field Goal Percentage Made)
FT (Free Throws Made)
FT (Free Throws Attempted)
FT (Free Throws Percentage Made)
ORB (Offensive Rebounds)
DRB (Defensive Rebounds)
TRB (Total Rebounds)
AST (Assists)
TOV (Turnovers)
STL (Steals)
BLK (Blocks)

Advanced
PER (Per Minute Efficiency)
OWS (Offensive Win Share)
DWS (Defensive Win Share)
WS (Total Win Share)
OBPM (Offensive Box Plus/Minus)
DBPM (Defensive Box Plus/Minus)
BPM (Total Box Plus/Minus)
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2. Team Statistics’ Correlation with Winning Percentage
Statistic
PS/G
PA/G
FG
FGA
FG%
3P
3PA
3P%
2P
2PA
2P%
FT
FTA
FT%
ORB
DRB
TRB
AST
STL
BLK
TOV
PF
PER
OWS
DWS
WS
OBPM
DBPM
BPM

Correlation with Winning Percentage
0.6
-0.5
0.6
-0.1
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.0
-0.4
0.7
0.2
0.0
0.3
-0.3
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.1
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.5

18
3. Multiple Regression for League
Term
Intercept
PS/G
FG%
3P%
2P%
WS
DBPM

Estimate
-56.5
0.0
-51.9
70.0
134.9
0.7
0.1

Std Error
21.0
0.2
83.1
42.7
62.5
0.1
0.1

t Ratio
-2.69
0
-0.63
1.64
2.16
9.02
2.04

Prob>[t]
0.0096
0.9976
0.5346
0.1074
0.0354
<.0001
0.0461

Significance
*

*
***
*
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4. Players Statistics’ Correlation with Salary
Statistic
Age
G
GS
MP
FG
FGA
FG%
3P
3PA
3P%
2P
2PA
2P%
FT
FTA
FT%
ORB
DRB
TRB
AST
STL
BLK
TOV
PF
PTS
PER
OWS
DWS
WS
WS/48
OBPM
DBPM
BPM

Correlation with Salary
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.1
0.3
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.4
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5. Player Multiple Regression
Term
Intercept
MP
FG
2P
FTA
DRB
TOV
PTS

Estimate
-15091
-141356
-292547
375719
-245081
721479
1077575
546253

Std Error
428275
49516
2073891
789910
523415
174180
394514
634507

t Ratio
-0.04
-2.85
-0.14
0.48
-0.47
4.14
2.73
0.86

Prob>[t]
0.9719
0.0045
0.8879
0.6345
0.6398
<.0001
0.0065
0.3897

Significance
**

***
**
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6. Sample Salary Calculations
Actual Salary
$62,552
$1,145,685
$3,992,040
$1,855,320
$12,000,000
$13,666,667
$1,276,061
$3,034,356
$65,000
$3,649,920
$3,282,056
$981,084
$981,084
$862,000
$1,063,384
$23,896,658
$7,000,000
$9,704,595

Projected Salary
$502,266
$5,524,924
$1,674,219
$0
$14,565,708
$7,868,831
$4,520,392
$2,846,173
$0
$5,692,346
$3,683,282
$5,357,502
$5,524,924
$2,176,485
$2,009,063
$6,027,189
$8,538,518
$3,181,017

Difference
($439,714)
($4,379,239)
$2,317,821
$1,855,320
($2,565,708)
$5,797,836
($3,244,331)
$188,183
$65,000
($2,042,426)
($401,226)
($4,376,418)
($4,543,840)
($1,314,485)
($945,679)
$17,869,469
($1,538,518)
$6,523,578

%
-703%
-382%
58%
100%
-21%
42%
-254%
6%
100%
-56%
-12%
-446%
-463%
-152%
-89%
75%
-22%
67%

Player
A.J. Price
Aaron Brooks
Aaron Gordon
Adreian Payne
Al Horford
Al Jefferson
Alan Anderson
Alec Burks
Alex Kirk
Alex Len
Alexey Shved
Alexis Ajinca
Al-Farouq Aminu
Allen Crabbe
Alonzo Gee
Amar'e Stoudemire
Amir Johnson
Anderson Varejao

Salary
Underpaid
Overpaid

Overpaid
Underpaid

Underpaid
Underpaid
Underpaid

Overpaid
Overpaid
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7. Top 5 Overpaid Players
Actual Salary
$23,500,000
$23,896,658
$22,458,000
$18,862,875
$23,180,790

Projected Salary
$334,844
$6,027,189
$4,855,236
$2,009,063
$6,864,299

Difference
$23,165,156
$17,869,469
$17,602,764
$16,853,812
$16,316,491

%
99%
75%
78%
89%
70%

Player
Kobe Bryant
Amar'e Stoudemire
Carmelo Anthony
Derrick Rose
Joe Johnson

Overpaid?
Overpaid
Overpaid
Overpaid
Overpaid
Overpaid
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8. Top 5 Underpaid Players
Actual Salary
$5,607,240
$2,008,748
$10,629,213
$1,127,400
$3,340,920

Projected Salary Difference
$23,439,070 ($17,831,830)
$18,751,256 ($16,742,508)
$26,285,243 ($15,656,030)
$15,570,239 ($14,442,839)
$17,746,724 ($14,405,804)

%
-318%
-833%
-147%
-1281%
-431%

Player
Anthony Davis
Jimmy Butler
Stephen Curry
Rudy Gobert
Damian Lillard

Underpaid?
Underpaid
Underpaid
Underpaid
Underpaid
Underpaid
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9. Team Salary Allocation Effectiveness
Team
ATL
PHO
UTA
POR
DET
PHI
DAL
SAS
BOS
DEN
OKC
LAC
MIL
MEM
ORL
CHA
GSW
TOR
SAC
HOU
CHI
NOP
WAS
CLE
MIN
IND
MIA
NYK
BRK
LAL

Effectiveness
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

ESPN Ranking
Believers
One Foot In
One Foot In
Believers
Believers
All-In
All-In
All-In
Believers
Skeptics
Believers
Skeptics
One Foot In
Believers
One Foot In
One Foot In
Believers
One Foot In
One Foot In
All-In
Skeptics
Skeptics
Skeptics
Believers
Skeptics
One Foot In
One Foot In
Non Believers
Non Believers
Non Believers
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10. Average Salary Allocation Effectiveness Wins versus ESPN Rankings
ESPN Ranking
All-In
Believers
One Foot In
Skeptics
NonBelievers

Average Effectiveness
10
11
15
19
29

Average Wins
45
50
38
38
25
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